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TRUST DRAFTING CONTEST
Sponsored by the Trust Departments of the Denver

Clearing House Banks
By CHARLES A. BAER, Estates Division, Colorado
National Bank

N THE April issue we outlined the plan of the banks abovementioned and printed the production of the winner of

the contest from the University of Colorado. In this
issue we submit the production of the winner from the University of Denver.
The judges were Mr. Edward C. King, Trust Officer,
International Trust Company, Denver; Hon. John T.
Adams, representing Denver University, of Denver, and Mr.
Lewis A. Dick, representing the Denver Bar Association.
Problem for the Contest of 1936-1937
STATEMENT OF FACTS:
You are an attorney engaged in the general practice of
law in the City and County of Denver. Mr. Alfred Hunting, a resident of Denver, comes to your office and asks you
to draw his will. He gives you the following information
with respect to his family, his property, and the disposition
which he wishes to make of his property in the event of his
death.
His family consists of his wife, Ellen, who is thirty
years old and wholly without experience in business matters, a daughter five years old named Mary, and a son eight
years old named Robert. Mrs. Hunting has no independent means, but her relatives are all thoroughly capable of
supporting themselves. Mr. Hunting's only other relatives
are three brothers, all of whom are confirmed bachelors.
Mr. Hunting has been engaged in the business of buying and selling securities for his own account, and he has no
downtown office.
Mr. Hunting's property consists of his residence (worth
about $15,000), his household furniture and equipment, an
automobile, and miscellaneous personal effects such as clothing, fishing rods, golf clubs, books, and jewelry. None of his
personal effects are heirlooms or are of more than ordinary
value. He has, in addition to the property above described,
stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange having a
market value of $50,000; miscellaneous corporate bonds
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secured by mortgages outside of the State of Colorado having
a market value of $25,000; Denver Special Improvement
District bonds having a value of $25,000, and a bank account
then amounting to about $10,000. He has no insurance,
being uninsurable.
Mr. Hunting's chief concern is the welfare of his wife
and children, but he would like to make a gift of about onetenth of his estate to one of the universities or colleges in
Colorado or New York for the purpose of making a scientific
investigation of the Dow theory. He wants his wife to have
the use of the family residence and furniture as long as she
wishes. All the rest of his estate he wishes to give to a trustee
with directions to pay the income to his wife as long as she
lives, and after her death to be held for the children in such
manner that income or principal or both can be used for their
support and education while they respectively are under the
age of twenty-five years. After his daughter reaches the age of
twenty-five years he wants the income from her portion to be
paid to her as long as she lives and then the corpus of her share
to go to her descendants, if any, and, if none, then to his
(the testator's) descendants, if any. When his son reaches the
age of twenty-five years Mr. Hunting wants his son's portion
to be paid to him as his absolute property, but if the son
should die before receiving final distribution then his share is
to go to the son's heirs at law.
Mr. Hunting says that if the income is insufficient to
provide for the needs of his wife and children he wants the
trustee to be able to use principal for their relief, and says
that if they should all die before the estate is distributed he
would want what is left to go to his brothers, or the survivor of them.
He then says: "That, in a general way, is what I want
to do, but I know very little about wills and trusts -and want
your advice. The only thing I have decided definitely is
that I should like to have the X Bank and Trust Company,
where I have done my banking for the last ten years, act as
executor and trustee, but I am not sure whether it would be
best to have it act alone or as co-executor and co-trustee with
my wife. What I want you to do is to think over my problem, make such changes, adjustments or elaborations as you
think best, and draw a will for me just as you think it should
be to best accomplish my purpose, and then send it to me
with a letter containing any explanations which you think
are necessary or pertinent. I am going away next week for
a vacation and I want to take the will and letter with me

and study them while I am away."
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You are to draw a will naming the X Bank and Trust
Company executor and trustee, either alone or with the wife
as co-executor or co-trustee, or both, as you may consider
best. The will should be drawn so that it will carry out Mr.
Hunting's wishes, but it should also represent your best
judgment as to the manner in which this should be done.
The will should confer upon the executor and trustee such
power and authority as you think necessary or proper to permit the executor or trustee to administer and invest the estate
according to sound business principles, but so that the beneficiaries will receive full benefit of the trustee's skill and
experience, and so that the estate will produce the maximum
income consistent with safety of the principal.
You should also prepare a letter for Mr. Hunting
explaining your reasons for any 'changes that you. have made
in. the details of his plan, why you think the executor and
trustee should be given the power and authority with respect
to investments, etc., that the will confers upon it, and explaining any other matters which you think the layman might
not understand.
Both substance and style of the will and letter will be
considered by the judges in awarding the prizes.

Denver, Colo., January 15, 1937.

MR. ALFRED M. HUNTING,
Equitable Building,
Denver, Colorado.

In re: LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT
DEAR MR. HUNTING:
Enclosed please find a tentative draft of your will which
you requested me to make for you some days ago. I have
had other copies made, which I shall retain in my possession
until the time when we see fit to make a redraft. I should
like to recommend to you that you read this instrument as
soon as possible, before the time when you plan to leave;
and if you find that it is satisfactory, come into the office
and execute it before the time you take your trip. I advise
this because of the fact that you have never before made a
'will, and should anything happen to you in the course of
your proposed trip, it would be well to have things prepared.
By way of explanation of the various phases of the

instrument I shall in this letter treat each clause of the will
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separately, and in order, and will attempt to explain the
meaning and possibilities of each.
In the first place you asked whether or not it would be
advisable to have your wife named as co-executor and
co-trustee. Inasmuch as she, as you say, has had no business
experience, I should say. that such a course would be inadvisable. The only thing that could be gained would be that
if she is co-executor or co-trustee with the X Bank and Trust
Company, would be that then she would be allowed a part
of the fees recovered by the executor and trustee. The inconvenience, however, to her, and to the efficient management
of the estate would seem to me to outweigh the pecuniary
advantage that she would thus have. Such action would result
in her having to go to the trust company and sign papers
every time that they wanted to act in respect to your estate,
and in the event that she was not at the time available, there
might be serious loss suffered because of any ensuing delay.
You will please note that I have used your full name and the
names and initials of your children in drawing this instrument.
In clause one of the will, the one marked with the Roman
numeral I, as you have directed, I have named the X Bank
and Trust Company as Executor and Trustee. I really think
that such action is the best course to follow because of seveial
reasons. They are equipped at the trust company to handle
just such estates as yours will prove to be, and their past
experience in such matters gives your estate a benefit which
could not be had with some other individual acting in the
capacity as executor and trustee. Further, it seems to me that
the making of the trust company both executor and trustee
is advisable because of the fact that in relation to the estate
there will be no substantial change of hands in the course of
the management of the estate funds, which might otherwise
work a loss to the beneficiaries under the will and trust.
As to clause two of the will, you gave me no specific
directions, but hearing you mention the fact that there was
such a family burial plot, I was certain that such direction
ought to be included in your will. Your children are minors
and know little of such things, and in the event that something should happen to you and your wife while you were
away, the will would certainly determine the matter, which
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I should think you would consider of sufficient importance
to include it in the instrument. I also incorporated into the
will the essence of the remarks which you made concerning
the marker for the grave. It is always advisable to include
in your will directions as to your burial if you have any
specific desires. In the event that I have presumed too much in
the including of these statements in the will, it will be a
matter of but a few moments to change the will.
In relation to the third clause of the will, the statements
therein are for the most part not absolutely necessary, except
the statement in regard to the taxes and the statements in regard to the charging of the expense. The statutes of the State of
Colorado provide that in all estates claims shall be paid in a
certain order, and the statutes set out the order. The statute
states that such items as just debts, funeral expenses, and
other expenses incident to the estate are payable before the
payment of any of the legacies. It is therefore merely a matter
of form to include such items in the will. I did include the
taxes because of the fact that I believe that it would be more
convenient for the management of the estate, and for the beneficiaries under the will to have all of the taxes paid before the
time when the various funds come into their hands. There
are two items in the taxation of the estate which I feel that I
should call your attention to. The inheritance tax is a tax
imposed by the State of Colorado, and is a charge against and
is paid by the beneficiary. The payment of this tax by the
executor relieves the beneficiary of the burden of paying the
tax out of the income from- the trust. The other item is the
federal estate tax, which is a tax on the corpus of the estate,
which tax can easily be paid out of the whole estate. 'To my
knowledge there is no possible way in which to "get around"
these taxes, and I should advise that they be paid immediately
to save the discount allowed for payment within six months
in the case of inheritance taxes.
As to the fourth clause of the will I believe that there
need be no explanation, except for the fact that I have included
automobiles and bric-a-brac in the enumeration. I believe
that this is advisable because of the fact that there is no mention of your automobiles in any other part of the will, and
because of the fact that the word bric-a-brac will include
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almost everything not already included, which would not
properly be considered as a part of the furniture, which has
been included under another part of the instrument.
As to the fifth item of the will, you will note that I
looked up the exact legal description of your property and
included it so that there could be no possible error as to the
property which you mean to subject to this clause. I would
advise that you look at the abstract of title of the property
which you have in your possession and be certain that the
description in the will is the same. I also thought it advisable
to include the statement that the property might be also used
for the benefit of the children.
The sixth clause of the will contains the legacy for the
investigation of the Dow theory that you mentioned. I presume that you had in mind the recently expounded theory of
Professor George Dow of the University of Colorado. I am
afraid that I neglected to ask you at the time of our consultation for more particulars concerning this bequest. Please
read it carefully, and if by any chance you had in mind
another Dow or another theory, we can easily change the
wording so that it will read as you wish. It is important in
bequests of this nature to state the purpose and identification
of the parties thereto with the greatest particularity so that
there will be no possible misconception. In the event, for
instance, that there are two such theories, the chances are that
the bequest would fail totally. The law is very unsettled on
this point, and therefore I recommend that the utmost care
be taken that no mistakes be made.
The seventh clause of the instrument is the so-called
power clause, which is so necessary for the proper and efficient
management of the estate and of the trust. In the will I have
in general given to the executor and trustee the greatest possible latitude so that they may manage the estate to the best
of their ability, unhampered by any of the restrictions which
the laws of the state impose. The basis for the restrictions
in the statutes lies in the fact that where an individual is
appointed as executor or trustee of an estate, there is more
chance that such a person will mismanage the estate and cause
a loss of a substantial part, or even all, of the estate, to the
detriment of the beneficiaries, and thus in effect destroy the
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whole intent of the testator in the making of the will. However, I am certain that the case is much different in the case,
as here, where the executor and the trustee of the estate is an
old, reliable, and experienced trust company. In such case
the restrictions offered by the statutes really serve to hamper
the efficient management of the estate. You will please note
that I have given this power to the X Bank and Trust Company, the full power both in their capacity as executor and
in their capacity as trustee. I believe this necessary because of
the fact that their real work of the preservation of your estate
begins at the time when you die, and it would amount to a
loss for them not to have this full power during the time of
the administration of the estate. I have put into the power
clause the statement that when the stocks or bonds are called
for payment, the trustee or executor shall reinvest in securities of a like character. There is a reason for this. In my experience I have discovered that the trust companies are very
conservative in their management of trust estates, and whenever it appears doubtful as to whether they have the authority
to make an investment under the terms of the will, then they
are inclined to follow the statutory restrictions, which I mentioned above, in which case the lack of the broadest powers
might work a slight loss to the estate. I am not certain whether
it is a generally known statistical fact or not, but my experience has been that where the trustee and executor had this
fullest power, the estate has had a far better yield than in the
cases where there have been either restrictions, or where there
has been some doubt that caused the trustee to invest in accord
with the statutes of the state. There are other reasons why
such broad powers should be given, especially to the trustee.
In the case of a trust as I have set up, where there is the chance
that the trustee may have to provide for the support, education and maintenance of the children, the trustee has to have
the broad power, the same that you would have, for the proper
accomplishment of this purpose. The many possibilities in
the lives of your wife and your children after your decease
could not all be included in any will, and therefore the widest
possible power for the trustee is of paramount importance for
their well being. Still another reason for the inclusion of such
wide powers for the executor and the trustee is the fact that
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under such a clause as this the trust company will not have
to seek the aid of the courts for guidance in the administration
and management of the estate, and also the trust company
will not have to employ the aid of counsel for such judicial
proceedings. This may in itself amount to a substantial saving to the estate. You might think that it would be risky to
have the management of the estate in the hands of someone
foreign to your family because of the fact that their remoteness would cause a lack of interest in the matter, but I feel
certain that on the contrary their interest will be more active,
for business reasons, than that of any individual could be.
Another reason for giving to the trust company in your case
the broadest possible powers would be that because of the
nature of your business you will undoubtedly have your
investments in the condition which you deem best, and the
trust company would be able to leave the funds invested in
the same securities which you had yourself found most profitable. This is true in your case especially because you have
had experience in the line of investments. But in spite of all
that I have to say in favor of the power clause that I have
incorporated into your will, I advise and recommend that
you take a copy of the instrument to the trust officer of the
X Bank and Trust Company and talk the matter over with
him. Any changes that you may then want to suggest could
easily be incorporated into the will.
The eighth clause of the will takes care of your family,
and there are a few items that I feel should be commented
upon. In the first place the fund could have been divided
into two separate funds, after the death of your wife, for the
use of each child. But had this procedure been followed there
would have been the possibility that in a relatively short time,
due to the increase or decrease in the value of the securities
invested in for each fund, that the ultimate bequest to either
of them might be larger than that to the other of them. Therefore I deem it best to have the whole fund together for so long
a time as is possible. Another reason for this is the fact that
the efficiency of the yield, as you well know, would be
impaired by such division of the fund, for the larger the fund,
the more possible the greater percentage of yield. In the case
of the bequest to your son you will note that I have made a
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slight change. I have constructed the paragraph (c) in such
a way that your son will have the opportunity to handle the
money, or income from the trust, himself between the ages of
twenty-one and twenty-five. I am certain that this is a good
idea, as it may serve to teach him, before he comes into the
possession of the whole of his share under the will, something
of the value of money, and something of the management of
his own affairs. Besides this, it will, or at least ought to, give
him something to spend for his amusement, which will afford
a broadening influence, which is so necessary for a boy of
that age.
You will note that one of the differences between clauses
(c) and (d) is the fact that in the case of your son's death
his "heirs-at-law" take the fund. In the case of your daughter's death her "descendants" take, and then your "descendants" take. I believe it necessary to explain the difference
, between these two words, and the construction of the clauses
as they now stand. The State of Colorado has a statute which
is familiarly called the statute of descent which provides the
manner in which the estate of a deceased person descends, that
is, it explains who are his heirs. This statute is followed
whenever the expression "heirs-at-law" is used. As to the
word "descendants"; technically defined, as opposed to "heirsat-law," the word would mean your children or issue, and
their children or issue, and no one would take collaterally.
But in effect the courts of Colorado have construed both of
the expressions the same, and the reason for mentioning the
difference is the fact that you mentioned both terms in your
directions to me, and I think that it would be advisable to
use either term in both places, but not both of them. If you
had something particular in mind, please do not fail to note
it so that I may determine whether or not my interpretation.
of your directions is correct.
Paragraph (e) of clause eight of the will is as you
directed, and, I believe, self-explanatory.
Paragraph (f) of clause eight presents a great deal of
difficulty. In the first place under paragraphs (c) and (d),
according to the statute of descent if your son died without
heirs, his sister would take his share. If she died without
descendants, then, as paragraph (d) directs, your descendants
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would take, and assuming that your wife and children have
all died, and they have no descendants other than those mentioned in the statute (your daughter would then be a descendant of your son, and you a descendant of your daughter),
then your brothers would take as statutory descendants of
you. Now according to the intention that you expressed to
me, if all of them die before the estate is distributed, then what
is left is to go to your brothers. That would seem to indicate
that there were two possible ways in which your brothers
might be benefited under your will. The latter directions,
however, I have had to change slightly to provide that in the
event of the death of all of your immediate family and in the
event that none of them have heirs or descendants named in
paragraphs (c) and (d), then your two brothers shall take
the estate. Otherwise there would seem to be an inconsistency or conflict in the will. I am certain that this is what you
meant when you directed me, and I have entered such provision in the will, which, of course, is subject to your approval.
I inserted the last portion of the paragraph knowing that
you are a graduate of Denver University. It will become
operative only on the extreme contingency that everyone mentioned in the will has died.
Paragraph (g) of clause eight is simply a formal matter
for the convenience in the management of the-estate, and.
simply amounts to an enlargement of the powers of the trustee
which might save time and trouble in the event of a dispute
on the question.
Paragraph (h) is likewise a formality, and when you
come to the office I shall show you the schedule mentioned.
The inclusion of such a statement in a will is usual and presents a basis for a more definite estimate of the cost of the
management of the estate both for your benefit and for the
benefit of your heirs.
Paragraph (i) is likewise a matter of course, and while
liberal it still furnishes the beneficiaries under the will, or
rather the trust, a means for obtaining information.
The last clause is, strange as it may seem to a layman,
one of the most important parts. In the execution of your
will, in the event that you should discover that your intent
is properly expressed and that you should want to execute it
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without consulting an attorney further, it is necessary that
you have at least two witnesses, who are not in any sense
beneficiaries under the will; that you sign the instrument
after filling out the date in the sight and presence of each of
them; and that after you have signed, each of them signs the
attestation clause in your sight and presence and in the sight
and presence of the other. The statutes of the state are very
strict in this requirement.
This, Mr. Hunting, is the most adequate explanation of
the will that I am able to make to you by letter. If there are
any other things which I have not mentioned, please do not
hesitate to consult with me concerning them at the earliest
possible time. There is an extreme possibility that the instrument as now drafted may be an exact interpretation of your
intent, and if such is the case I cannot urge you too strongly
to see to the proper execution of the will at the earliest possible moment. Any changes that you may want to make can
probably be accomplished in a half day, and therefore I should
like to advise you to read the instrument, have it corrected,
and execute it before the time when you make your proposed
trip.
Last Will and Testament
I, Alfred Mason Hunting, a resident of the City and County of
Denver, and the State of Colorado, being of lawful age, of good health,
and of sound and disposing mind and memory, and being mindful of
the extent of my property and of the obligations which I owe to my
wife and children, do hereby make, publish and declare this instrument
to be my last WILL AND TESTAMENT, hereby revoking all other
wills and codicils heretofore made by me.
I.

I do hereby nominate, constitute and appoint the X Bank and
Trust Company, of Denver, Colorado, as Executor of this my last Will
and Testament, and as Trustee under the provisions of this instrument,
and do request that the said X Bank and Trust Company shall be permitted to qualify as Executor and Trustee without giving bond.

II.
I direct that my remains be buried in the Hunting family plot at
Fairmount Cemetery, in Arapahoe County, Colorado, and direct that
no sum larger than two hundred dollars shall be expended in the erection of a marker at my grave.
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III.
I direct that all of my just debts and funeral expenses, the expenses
of my last illness, and that all inheritance taxes and estate taxes and the
expenses of the administration of my estate shall be paid as soon after
my decease as shall be found convenient, and that the entire amount
thereof shall be charged against the principal or the income of my estate.
IV.
I hereby give and bequeath all of my personal effects, such as my
automobiles, jewelry, clothing, bric-a-brac, trinkets, fishing rods, golf
clubs, books and so forth, to my wife, Ellen, for her sole use and benefit
forever.

V.
I hereby give, devise, and bequeath my residence property, consisting of lots five to ten, inclusive, in Block one, Colfax Avenue Addition,
in the City and County of Denver, Colorado, and the improvements
thereon, and the furniture and equipment therein to my Trustee to hold
for the use and benefit of my wife for so long as she wishes. Thereafter
the said property shall be sold and the proceeds therefrom shall become a
part of my residuary estate, unless my Trustee deems it advisable to retain the said property as a home for either or both of my two children
for so long as my Trustee deems best for said children.
VI.
I hereby give and bequeath to the Board of Regents of the University of Colorado, AS TRUSTEES, the sum of Nine Thousand Dollars
($9,000.00) IN TRUST, NEVERTHELESS, on the condition that
the said Trustees shall use the said sum, both principal and interest for
the purpose of the scentific investigation of the so-called Dow Theory of
Economics, expounded by Professor George A. Dow of the University
of Colorado. I further direct in this respect that in the event that the
money be not used for such purpose, or in the event that all of the money
be not so used, or in the event that the work of the said investigation
has not been commenced within a period of five years after my decease,
that the said sum, or the balanci of the said sum, shall revert to and
become a part of my residuary estate.
VII.
I hereby authorize and empower my above named Executor and
Trustee to collect and marshal together all of my property and assets,
whether real, personal, or mixed, and wheresoever situate, as soon as
possible after my decease, and to handle and control such property, and
to collect all rents and profits of every kind, arising from my property,
for the purpose of paying my just debts and other expenses, and for the
purpose of carrying out the terms of this instrument. I further authorize
my Executor and Trustee to sell, mortgage, pledge, or to otherwise dispose of any part or all of my estate, subject to the trusts created in para-
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graphs five (V) and six (VI) of this instrument at either public or
private sale, and without obtaining any order of any court for authority
to so do, and without appraisement of any of my said estate, at such
times and on such terms and conditions as my Executor or Trustee shall
deem meet and proper. I further authorize my Executor and Trustee to
make all settlements or compromises of claims allegedly due at the time
of my death, or arising during the administration of my estate without
order for authority from any court. I further authorize my Executor
and Trustee to execute, acknowledge, and deliver all deeds necessary for
the conveyance of any of my estate, and other writings necessary for the
management of any part or all of my estate. I further grant unto the said
X Bank and Trust Company the fullest possible powers in the management of my estate, both in its capacity as Executor and in its capacity as
Trustee, to the same extent that I would have as if living, together with
full power to invest or reinvest all or any part of my estate and the trust
fund hereinafter mentioned, and the increase therefrom. I further authorize my said Executor and Trustee to take and hold those securities which
I may own at the time of my death, free from any liability or responsibility imposed on executors or trustees by any statute, or by any decision
or any court restricting or limiting investments for such funds, or the
purchasing or holding by an executor or trustee of any particular class or
kind of property. I direct further that on the call for payment. or in the
case of a sale of any security, whether stocks or bonds, which I may own
at the time of my death, that my Executor and Trustee shall invest the
proceeds received in such manner in property of the same general character. I further direct that no person or corporation dealing with the said
X Bank and Trust Company shall be under any obligation to see to the
application of any purchase money paid to the said X Bank and Trust
Company, or to inquire as to the authority for any action taken by the
said X Bank and Trust Company in reference to my estate or to the said
trusts herein created.

VIII.
I hereby give, devise and bequeath, and I direct that my Executor
shall transfer and convey upon the closing of my estate to itself as
TRUSTEE, all of the rest, residue and remainder of my property, both
real, personal and mixed, and wheresoever situate, of which I may die
seized or possessed, or to which I may be entitled to at the time of my
death or thereafter, after the payment of my just debts, taxes, expenses
of administration of my estate, and legacies, mentioned in the foregoing
part of this instrument, IN TRUST, NEVERTHELESS, for the uses
and purposes, and subject to the terms and conditions hereinafter set
forth, that is to say:
(a)
Said Trustee shall take, hold, manage, invest, and reinvest
the trust property, and collect the rents and profits incident thereto and
derived therefrom, and shall have all of the same powers which are hereinbefore granted.
The Trustee shall pay all of the net income resulting from
(b)
such investments to my wife, Ella, for her sole use and benefit for the
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rest of her natural life. I leave the education, support, and maintenance
of my two children entirely in her discretion during her lifetime. If such
income proves not sufficient for the purposes herein set out, then I authorize my Trustee to pay to her such part of the principal of the fund as said
Trustee shall deem necessary.
(c)
After the death of my wife the Trustee shall pay out of onehalf of the income from said trust estate, such amounts as are necessary
for the education, support, and maintenance in the manner in which he
is then living, of my son, Robert M. Hunting, until the time when my
son reaches the age of twenty-one years, at which time said Trustee shall
pay the whole of said one-half portion of said income directly to my son,
which amount he is to use for his own support, education, maintenance
and use until he reaches the age of twenty-five years. When he becomes
twenty-five years old, the Trustee shall pay to my said son, Robert, onehalf of the corpus of said trust estate for his sole use and benefit forever.
If my son Robert should die before receiving his final share or portion of
said trust estate, then the Trustee shall pay his said share or portion to
his heirs-at-law.
The Trustee shall pay out of the remaining one-half of the
(d)
income from said trust estate such amounts as are necessary for the support, education, and maintenance in the manner in which she is then
living, of my daughter, Mary G. Hunting, until the time when she
reaches the age of twenty-five years. At the time when my daughter
becomes twenty-five years old, then the said Trustee shall pay to her all
of the income arising from and out of the trust estate then remaining in
the hands of the Trustee for the rest of her natural life. On the death
of my daughter Mary, the said Trustee shall pay the whole of the corpus
of said trust estate then remaining to her descendants, if any, and if none,
then the said Trustee shall pay said trust estate then remaining to my
descendants.
If the income of said trust estate be not sufficient for the pur(e)
poses set out in sub-paragraphs (c) and (d) above, then the Trustee
shall be and is hereby authorized to use any part or all of the principal
therefor.
In the event that my children have died without heirs or
(f)
descendants before receiving final distribution under this trust, I direct
that my Trustee shall pay the trust estate, in equal shares to my two
brothers, John D. Hunting and Charles R. Hunting, or to the survivor
of them. In the event that neither of my brothers is then living, then I
direct that my Trustee shall pay the said trust estate to the Colorado
Seminary, a corporaian organized under the laws of the State of Colorado, and located at Denver in the said State, to be used at the discretion of the Trustees of said Colorado Seminary.
(g)
I direct in reference to this trust that the Trustee shall have
the sole discretion in determining whether items received or disbursed
shall be credited to or charged against the income or principal, and the
decision of said Trustee shall be conclusively binding for all purposes.
(h)
I further direct that the Trustee shall be entitled to compen-

DICTA

173

sation for its services in accord with the schedule of fees now authorized
by the Denver Clearing House Association.
(i)
I further direct that the Trustee shall furnish to the beneficiaries a report on the condition of the trust estate at least semi-annually,
and be prepared to give information to the said beneficiaries as to the
condition of the said estate at any time on adequate notice.

Ix.
In WITNESS whereof, I, Alfred Mason Hunting, do set my hand
and seal to this instrument, my last WILL AND TESTAMENT, contained on seven sheets of paper in all, including this one, this
...
day of.------ ----, A. D. 19 -----------

........................ .........
- - - ------(S E AL )

The foregoing instrument was at the date hereof signed, sealed,
published and declared to be his last Will and Testament by the above
named Alfred Mason Hunting, testator, in our sight and presence; and
we believing him to be at the time of sound and disposing mind and
memory, at his direction and by his request hereunto subscribe our names
as witnesses thereto, in his sight and presence, and in the sight and presence of each other.

Constitutional Government
"Other misfortunes may be borne, or their effects overcome. If
disastrous wars should sweep our commerce from the ocean, another
generation may renew it; if it exhaust our treasury, future industry may
replenish it; if it desolate and lay waste our fields, still, under a new cultivation, they will grow green again, and ripen to future harvests.
"It were but a trifle even if the walls of yonder Capital were to
crumble, if its lofty pillars should fall, and its gorgeous decorations be
all covered by the dust of the valley. All these may be rebuilt.
"But who shall reconstruct the fabric of demolished government?
"Who shall rear again the well-proportioned columns of constitutional liberty?
"Who shall frame together the skilful architecture which unites
national sovereignty with State rights, individual security, and Public
prosperity?
"No,if these columns fall, they will be raised not again. Like the
Coliseum and the Parthenon, they will be destined to a mournful, and a
melancholy immortality. Bitterer tears, however, will flow over them
than were ever shed over the monuments of Roman or Grecian art; for
they will be the monuments of a more glorious edifice than Greece or
Rome ever saw, the edifice of constitutional American liberty."

-From Daniel Webster's Speech at the CentennialAnniversary of
Washington'sBirth.
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To Sue or Not to Sue
From Los Angeles Bar Association Bulletin
Somewhere I read a story of a litigant waiting in his attorney's
reception room, whose eye was caught by the motto, "Suum cuique,"let each have his own. He puzzled over it for a while, and finally transliterated it, "Sue 'er quick," and told his attorney that it was mighty
bad spelling! Judging from some of the suits that are brought, the
rustic's translation must be that of a good many lawyers. In other
words, there are suits that should never have been brought, and likewise defenses that should never be made. If we but remembered that it is
the public's time that is consumed in court, that it is paid for by taxes,
we might be rather more considerate and thoughtful in filing actions, as
well as more expeditious in dispatching them.
We have heard of "sand-bag legislation"; one is inclined to wonder
whether there is not also "sandbag" litigation,--cases filed merely
because of their nuisance value. No lawyer can afford to file such an
action, whether intended merely to vex and harass, or to mulct a few
dollars from some hapless victim. Tennyson's line might be rewritten,
"Vext with lawyers and harassed with debt," "Vext and harassed with
lawyers." The control of democratic government lies in public opinion,
and the public opinion of the profession, if unfavorable, shears it of
well nigh all power to direct the course of affairs. Every such action contributes to public disfavor, and can never result in any real profit to the
lawyer.
When a client states his facts, the attorney is not an advocate, but
a judge. Now is the time to determine, first, is there a right of action or
defense? Second, if so, is it worth bringing into court? What are the
chances of compromise and adjustment? There will be litigation enough
when the conscientious lawyer settles all the controversies he can outside
the courtroom. Is it not the general impression that there are many cases
crowding our calendars that either should not be there at all, or that
would probably yield to friendly negotiation and adjustment?
Always the bar in America has been influential in governmental
affairs; never was there more need of that influence than now. Our conduct can greatly increase or diminish it.-F. G. T.
Obliging.-A Los Angeles patrolman had brought in a Negro
woman somewhat the worse for wear, and the desk sergeant, with his
very best scowl, roared:
"Liza, you've been brought in for intoxication!"
"Dat's fine!" beamed Liza. "Boy, you can start right now!"The Bee-Hive (East Hartford, Conn.).
There are only two kinds of women clients: those who pay liberally and those who complain to the Bar Association.

BANK

CHECKS-ACCEPTANCE-CONSTRUCTIVE-DISCHARGE

OF

DRAWER-Roberts us. School DistrictNo. I of Kit Carson County,
Colorado---No. 13695-Decided December 21, 1936-Opinion
by Mr. Justice Holland.
Roberts brought suit against the school district, the county commissioners, Boggs as county treasurer, and Rose, his successor, and
Stockgrowers State Bank and McFerson as bank commissioner to recover
on a check issued by Boggs as county treasurer in payment of certain
warrants of the school district held by Roberts. Roberts deposited the
check in a Colorado Springs bank and in turn the check went through
several banks for collection purposes, consuming a number of successive
days and was lost in transit, whereupon on September 26 payment was
stopped and the county treasurer issued a duplicate check which took
the same course through the various banks and reached the Stockgrowers
Bank at Burlington, Colo., on October 1 in the morning and this bank
remained open all that day and until noon on October 2, when its doors
were closed and possession taken by the bank commissioner. The check
was retained by the bank and bank commissioner for more than 24 hours
before it was returned and payment refused. The county treasurer had
on deposit in the bank on the day the check arrived sufficient funds to
take up the check. Judgment was rendered below against the Stockgrowers bank and the bank commissioner but dismissed as against the
other defendants, including the school district. Proceedings in error
to review the judgment against the bank and bank commissioner was
dismissed by the Supreme Court and the plaintiff is now prosecuting
error to review the dismissal of his action against Boggs, the county
treasurer.
1. The recovery of judgment by the plaintiff against the bank
and the bank commissioner was upon the theory of constructive acceptance of plaintiff's check by the bank.
2. Boggs, the county treasurer, as drawer of the check, was, discharged from his liability thereon by such acceptance.
3.
The judgment obtained by the plaintiff against the bank and
the bank commissioner, the full benefits of which he may now enjoy,
precludes him from proceeding against the county treasurer.
4. The plaintiff procured the constructive acceptance of the check
by the bank. Plaintiff therefore cannot pursue a further remedy against
Boggs, the drawer, in the same matter upon which there is a positive
statutory discharge as under Sec. 4005, C. L. 1921, where the holder of a
check procures it to be accepted or certified, the drawer and all endorsers
are discharged from liability thereon.--Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Young and Mr. Chief Justice Campbell not participating.
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CONTRACT-REFORMATION OF CONTRACT-WHEN NOT REFORMED

-Muchow et al. vs. Central City Gold Mines Company-No.
14079-Decided February 1, 1937--Opinion by Mr. JusticeHolland.
Defendant in error was plaintiff below. Plaintiff sought reformation of a contract to deposit tailings on defendant's land.
1. In order that equity may grant reformation of a contract there
must exist mutuality in the mistake.
2. Where plaintiff had opportunity, before entering into a contract, to acquaint itself with information and failed to acquire same, it
cannot complain that it entered into a contract with lack of knowledge.
3. Where plaintiff entered into a contract with defendant to deposit tailings from its mill upon land not then owned by the defendant
but which defendant was in process of acquiring from a railroad company and plaintiff had the opportunity of ascertaining exactly what this
land was, it is estopped from claiming mistake where plaintiff failed to
avail itself of such accessible information, when it later developed that
the land it expected it was getting the right to deposit tailings upon was
not in accordance with its expectations.
4. The contract between the defendant and the railroad company
being duly recorded, plaintiff had this source of information available,
which it failed to exercise.
5. Where plaintiff partially performs, it should not expect a
court of equity to reform a contract it had already recognized and partly
performed, because plaintiff discovered later that the contract was not
profitable.
6. The contract gave plaintiff what it wanted, that is, the right
to deposit tailings on the land involved. The defendant made no misrepresentations as to the location or extent of the land and under such
circumstances, equity will leave the parties where it found them.
7. The court below erred in decreeing reformation of the contract.---udgment reversed.
LIMITATIONS-STATUTE

OF-PAYMENTS-EFFECT OF--AGENCY-

Dodge vs. East-No. 13846-Decided February 1, 1937--Opinion by Mr. Justice Knous.
1. Where an agent is allowed to collect for principal with authority to credit collections on an open account owing to agent by principal,
such collection, within the six years period of limitations, tolls the
statute.
2. Such application of collection has the same effect as voluntary
payments made by debtor.
3. Absence from the state, under Sec. 6417, C. L. 1921, tolls
the statute of limitations.-Judgment affirmed.
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FRAUD-PLEADING-DEMURRER-APPLICATION
OF STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS TO FRAUD--The First Mortgage Securities Company

et at. vs. Fader-No. 13825-Decided January 25, 1937--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Action to quiet title was brought by Fader in the district court of
Yuma county, Colorado, and a judgment and decree entered in his favor.
The Platte Valley Loan and Investment Company, a corporation, prior
to 1926, was indebted to the United States National Bank of Denver in
the sum of approximately $100,000, which indebtedness was guaranteed by Ferguson and others, and while so indebted Ferguson, guarantor,
conveyed all his real estate in Yuma county to a firm of which he was
a member, which firm conveyed the same property to Fader, who was an
employee of the company. The United States National Bank transferred its indebtedness to the First Mortgage Securities Company, which
brought suit in the Denver district court against the maker and endorser
and attached land in Yuma county which had been conveyed to Fader.
Fader was not a party to this action. Judgment was had and attachment
sustained, execution issued and the land was sold by the sheriff and
bought in by the plaintiff in that action. Thereafter, Fader, brought
this action to quiet his title. The answer in this action set up, among
other things, that the conveyance to Fader was made to defraud the
creditors. Fader demurred and particularly demurred to the counterclaim on the ground that it was barred by the three year and five year
statute of limitations. Demurrer sustained. Judgment on the pleadings
in favor of Fader was entered quieting his title.
1. The court obtained jurisdiction in the prior attachment action
and its judgment therein carries every presumption of regularity.
2. Even though Fader was not a party to that action it does not
avail him where the land attached was fraudulently conveyed to him to
hinder and delay or defraud the attaching creditor.
3. Where fraud tainted the conveyance then so far as a judgment
creditor is concerned the property remains subject to attachment as much
as though the fraudulent deed had never been executed.
4. If the allegations of defendants' answer and counterclaim are
true, then the conveyances from Ferguson and finally to Fader are void
as to creditors.
5. This would be true even if the conveyance to Fader was a voluntary one without knowledge on his part of the intent of the grantor.
6. However, the answer alleges that he did have knowledge and
participated in the furtherance of the scheme of his grantor to defraud.
7. The statute of limitations did not apply in this case. The trial
court erroneously sustained the demurrers to the answer and counterclaim
and the motion to strike.-Judgment reversed.
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FIRE INSURANCE-ATTEMPT TO CANCEL-NECESSITY OF FIVE DAYS'
NOTICE OF CANCELLATION TO INSURED--FAILURE TO GIVE NoTICE-Loss-Royal Exchange Assurance of London vs. LuttrellNo. 13759-Decided December 22, 1936-Opinion by Mr. Justice Butler.
Luttrell and another sued Royal Exchange Assurance of London
on a policy of fire insurance and recovered judgment below. The policy
was written and delivered December 6.
On the following March 2 the
insurance carrier, through its agent, wrote to the insured that the Royal
Exchange did not wish to further continue the policy in force and
requested insured to return the policy for cancellation and at the same
time enclosed to insured another policy in another company to take the
place of the policy cancellation of which was sought. This letter did
not reach the insured until subsequent to a fire loss.
Insured refused to
return the policy but retained the policy issued in lieu thereof.
1. The policy contained a clause that it could be cancelled by the
insurance company at any time by giving notice to the insured a notice
of cancellation in writing at least five days before cancellation would be
effective.
2.
Such notice was not given in this case five days before t;he loss.
3.
The policy was in full force and effect at the time the loss
occurred.
4.
There was no evidence that assured either consented to cancellation before loss occurred or waived the notice of such cancellation
provided for in the policy.
5.
There was no ratification upon the part of the insured of the.
act of the agent in the attempted cancellation.-Judgmentaffirmed.
Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Holland
dissent.
MALICIOUS
PROSECUTION - INSUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT
DISMISSAL FOR INSUFFICIENCY-WAIVING RULE WHERE
CAUSE IS PROSECUTED BY LAYMAN INSTEAD OF A LAWYERSPECIAL APPEARANCE-Viles vs. Symes et al.-No. 13807Decided January 25, 1937-Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
Viles, plaintiff, brought an action for malicious prosecution against
the defendants. The plaintiff was a layman who prosecuted the case
without legal counsel.
Two of the defendants, L. B. Johnson and
Percy A. Robinson, were dismissed under special appearances, the first
being sustained on the ground that it was a personal action and as to
Johnson, service was made in California where he was a resident. Special appearance of Robinson was sustained on the ground that he was
later included as a defendant in an amended complaint without leave of
court first obtained. As to the comPlaint, the court sustained a motion
to make it more specific and an amended complaint was filed and to the
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amended complaint a motion was filed to make it more specific, which
was sustained and the plaintiff filed a bill of particulars which on motion
was stricken because insufficient and judgment of dismissal was entered.
The plaintiff then orally moved for leave to file another amended complaint, which was denied.
1. In view of the fact that the plaintiff is a layman and appeared
without counsel, we apply Rule 35 of this court providing that the court
may in its discretion notice any error appearing of record but not properly
assigned.
2. In the exercise of a sound discretion the court below should
have given the plaintiff leave to again attempt to file a further amended
complaint as to matters clearly within the plaintiff's knowledge.
3. In making such ruling it is not determined whether the complaint states a cause of action or whether a cause of action can be started.
4. The ruling of the court dismissing the defendants, Johnson
and Robinson, was correct.
The judgment, insofar as it quashed the service of summons as to
defendants, L. B. Johnson and Percy A. Robinson, is affirmed. In all
other respects it is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.-Mr. Justice Bouch dissents. Mr. Justice Bakke and Mr. Justice
Knous not participating. Mr. Justice Bouck files dissenting opinion.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-CAUSE OF DEATH-NECESSITY OF
CAUSE BEING ACCIDENTAL-HEART DISEASE OR OVEREXER-

TION-The Industrial Commission et at. vs. Wetz et al.-No.
14057-DecidedJanuary 11, 1937--Opinion by Mr. JusticeHotland.
The Commission denied any award to compensation to the widow
of Wetz on the ground that his death was not the result of accidental
injury, but was due to heart failure. The District Court reversed this.
1. The burden is upon a claimant to show by sufficient substantial evidence that the death was caused by an accident arising out of and
in the course of the employment and that it had a direct causal connection
therewith and that it must be traceable to a definite source.
2. The matter of "overexertion" is the only question here presented for solution. There is no testimony to the effect that deceased
overexerted himself in any way. The necessary link connecting heart
failure with the employment is not established by the evidence.
3.
To make its finding setting aside the award of the Commission,
the District Court must have based it upon inferences drawn from the
evidence, in violation of the rule that such inferences and conclusions are
solely for the Commission and not for the courts.
4. The question of whether the deceased died of heart failure or
from overexertion while repairing a tractor was a controverted question
before the Commission, thus leaving the question one of fact for the
Commission and not one of law for the court.-Judgment reversed.
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REPLEVIN-CHATrEL MORTGAGE-DURESS--QUESTION FOR JURY

-Walker

vs. Dearing et al.-No. 13867-Decided January 25,

1937-Opinionby Mr. Justice Holland.
This is a replevin action brought by Walker to obtain possession of
personal property covered by delinquent chattel mortgage. The plaintiff
was successful in justice court and on appeal to the county court jury
brought in a verdict for the defendants. Walker represented one E. R.
Powell, who obtained a judgment in justice court. Walker had himself
appointed special constable and proceeded to make a levy on defendants'
household furniture and represented to them that he had acquired a
mortgage against the furniture and unless they gave him additionhal security he would take their furniture under the levy. Walker had already
levied upon an automobile under the judgment. Under these circumstances the Dearings gave a second mortgage to Walker and in consideration Walker satisfied the judgment and released the automobile.
Defendants failed to pay the mortgage and replevin action was brought by
Walker and redelivery bond given by defendants.
1. There was not sufficient evidence to submit to the jury the
question of duress.
2. While the methods of Walker in obtaining the second mortgage might be looked upon with disfavor, yet he was only pursuing a
right that the law gave him and the evidence is not sufficiently convincing
to support the alleged duress.
3. While the position of the Dearings was an embarrassing one
and Walker took advantage of the situation, all the circumstances of the
case finally operated for the present relief of the debtors. Under these
circumstances, the claim of defendants that the second chattel mortgage
was without consideration is without foundation.
4. The verdict was contrary to law.-Judgment reversed.

MONEY LENDERS ACT OF 1913-LOANS--CHARGING INTEREST IN

EXCESS OF LAWFUL RATE-EFFECT-Waddell vs. Traylor-

No. 13979-Decded January 25, 1937--Opinion by Mr. Justice
)foung.
Traylor recovered a judgment below for an unpaid balance of promissory note. Defend-ant's first defense was payment of more than sufficient to satisfy the note providing they were only charged lawful interest. Second defense was that part of the principal expressed in the note
was in truth and fact unlawful interest and included in the face of the
note. Third defense was that Traylor as a money lender failed to comply
with chapter 108 of the 1913 Session Laws. Fourth defense was that the
interest charges were unconscionable and oppressive. The court sustained general demurrer to the second, third and fourth defenses.
1. The Money Lenders Act of 1913 above referred to is constitutional for the title is sufficiently broad to cover the act.
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2. The exceptions made in the act are reasonable.
3. The provisions of the act that treble the interest paid, if in
excess of twelve per cent, may be recovered and that a violation of the
act shall be a misdemeanor is a declaration of public policy. A contract
for payment of interest of more than twelve per cent shall not be enforceable as to such excess.
4. To permit the plaintiff to recover the interest claimed would
allow a consideration for the use of the money received greatly in excess
of rate fixed by the 1913 act.
5. Courts will not lend their aid to the enforcement of terms of
a contract which will result in the consummation of a criminal act, or
one contrary to the public policy of the state.
6. Even where unlawful interest is charged a recovery can be had
for the amount of the money actually loaned, together with such consideration for its use as might lawfully have been contracted for under
the act, because the act does not make the note void by reason of excessive
charge of interest but specifies the penalty for charging excessive interest.
-- Judgment reversed and remandedfor further proceedings.
ELECTIONS-PETITION

FOR RESTRAINING

ORDER

AGAINST ELEC-

TION OFFICIALS AND OTHERS--SUFFICIENCY OF-The People

of the State of Colorado on the Relation of Raymond L. Sauter
et al. vs. Monson et al.-No. 14055-Decided October 28, 1936
-- Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
Original action for restraining order against respondents for interfering in any way with a free, fair and open election, from threatening
to discharge or to reward any employees of the City and County of
Denver for giving or withholding his support in favor of or against any
candidate and for appointment of watchers in polling places in Denver
and in two precincts in Grand county.
1. The petition fails to state a cause of action.
2. The petitioners have failed to charge facts sufficient to bring
them under the rule announced in People ex rel. Attorney General vs.
Tool, 35 Colo. 225, 86 Pac. 224.
3. Where there is no charge of fraud, wrongdoing, conspiracy or
confederation against the election commission or any of the election
judges, the petition states no cause of action.
4. As to Grand county, the petition fails to show that the ordinary processes of the law are not sufficient to detect and defeat fraudulent registrations if they exist.-Petition dismissed.
Mr. Justice Bouck, Mr. Justice Holland and Mr. Justice Young
concur.
Mr. Chief Justice Campbell and Mr. Justice Butler not participating.
Mr. Justice Burke dissents.
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PUBLIC UTILITIES-POWER

OF STATE UNIVERSITY TO OPERATE

BUSSES FOR STUDENTS-Burnside et at. vs. Regents of the Uni-

versity of Colorado-No. 13842-Decided February 1, 1937Opinion by Mr. JusticeBakke.
Plaintiffs in error, plaintiffs below, sought to enjoin the regents
of the University of Colorado from operating certain motor busses for
the use of students during the summer school on the ground that they
had not complied with the Public Utilities Commission of Colorado
laws. Judgment denying injunction.
1. The university was operating these busses during the summer
school session exclusively for the use of its students under special authority from the P. U. C. authorizing it so to do and the P. U. C. had the
right to make such exception as long as only university students were
served by the busses and the general public was not transported.
2. It further appears that the university carries public liability
insurance on the busses it operates and further that the busses while
operating in the Rocky Mountain National Park are specifically exempted
by the Department of the Interior from their rules and regulations governing commerical vehicles.
3. Under the Constitution, the university, through its board of
regents, has the exclusive control and direction of all funds of and appropriations to the university and such board having determined that the
operation of the busses were a necessary incident to the operation of the
university it does not lie with the court to interfere with their discretion
in deciding what methods they adopt to accomplish what they deem
necessary for the university and it is not for the court to substitute its
opinion as to the necessity thereof.
4. The university was within its legal rights in so operating the

busses.-Judgment affirmed.
INSURANCE-LIFE--SERVICE OF SUMMONS-WHAT CONSTITUTES
DOING BUSINESS WITHIN THE STATE-WHAT CONSTITUTES AN

AGENT-Union Mutual Life Company of Iowa vs. Bailey-No.
13872-DecidedJanuary 25, 1937--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Bailey, the beneficiary in life insurance policy on his wife, recovered
below after the death of his wife. The insurance company was an Iowa
company, had not complied with the laws of Colorado, but solicited the
application of the deceased by broadcasting over the radio. The application was mailed from Denver, received in Iowa and the policy issued in
Iowa. After the death of insured the insurance company sent an agexnt
to Denver with power to adjust or reject the claim and this suit was
started and service procured on this agent. The court below held that
the service was good and that the company was doing business in Colorado and therefore subject to the Colorado law.
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1. Service of summons may be upon any agent of a foreign corporation doing business in this state.
2. When a foreign corporation invests its agent with broad powers to settle, adjust or reject its claims, service upon such an agent is
proper.
3. Foreign insurance company which solicits business in Colorado
over the radio and receives applications for insurance resulting from such
solicitation upon which it delivers policies in Colorado, is doing business
in Colorado and is subject to the Colorado insurance laws.
4. Under such circumstances, the Colorado law provides that the
policy shall constitute the entire contract and is incontestable after having
been in force two years from its date and it was unlawful for the insurance company to deliver a policy in Colorado without incorporating such
provision.-Judgment affirmed.

UNLAWFUL DETENTION-REDEMPTION OTHERWISE THAN BY STATUTE-LIS PENDENS--Scott Vs. Weimer-No. 13998-Decided
October 5, 1936--Opinion by Mr. JusticeHilliard.
This was an unlawful detention suit. Judgment below for plaintiff. Plaintiff has foreclosed a deed of trust and at sale became the purchaser. Certificate of purchase was issued and after period of redemption, received trustee's deed and then brought the action for unlawful
detainer.
1. It is no defense that subsequent to foreclosure that defendant
could have procured a Home Owners' Loan payable in bonds for the
full amount of the judgment and costs. The status of debtor and
creditor had closed. To effect redemption, defendant was required to
make payment to the public trustee. Plaintiff was not obliged to accept
the offer.
2. Plaintiff is not required to file a notice of lis pendens so far as
defendant is concerned.--Judgment affirmed.
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